The Ministry for the Environment is running a consultation on reforming industrial allocation in the NZ ETS. It closes for submissions today.
Industrial allocation is the process where large trans-national emitters who have to surrender emissions units under the emissions trading scheme (that being the whole point of an ETS) are 'allocated' (given) free emissions units.
Remember that an emissions unit is the legal right in the form of a transferable permit to emit greenhouse gases. They are just like petrol vouchers. Or like a voucher to burn coal or a voucher to emit methane.
The units say in effect "the owner of this unit has the absolute right and permission to burn some fossil fuel, a tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent emissions per unit". So every emission unit allocated to an emitter says to those emitters just go burn some carbon.
The process doesn't just reduce the carbon price. It makes it a wealth transfer and therefore a carbon refund.
New Zealand Steel Ltd and New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Ltd are allocated more emission units than they need to surrender. The net effect of industrial allocation is that the two trans-national high-emitting companies have been net sellers of emissions units in every year of the emissions trading scheme since 2010.
After nine years of National Government amendments to the emissions trading scheme, the industrial allocation settings were basicly "free over allocation of emissions units to emitters for ever"
Since 2017 the Minister for Cimate Change James Shaw and the Ministry for the Environment have made one pathetically minor tweak to the industrial allocation settings. The eternal and un-ending entitlement to free units will decline by 1% a year from 2020.
Now the latest consultation proposes refining some of the minor detail of the baselines used for industrial processes that have the privilege of being eligible for industrial allocation free unit giveaway
I have just sent in my submission. So here it is. I argue a couple of basic points. There is a climate emergency. The only issue that matters is to rapidly reduce NZ's emissions of greenhouse gases. But MfE proposes incremental tweaks to industrial allocation settings in the ETS. This is just moving the deckchairs on the Titanic.
The industrial allocation rules should not be refined, they should be abolished. They have no place in an ETS designed to rapidly reduce emissions. I state that the only Government policy programme for reducing emissions that is worse than the ETS is the incremental process to reform the ETS
Submission to Ministry for the Environment on Reforming industrial allocation in the NZ ETS 17/09/2021
The world is facing a climate emergency. According to the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report (WG1), in order to limit warming to 1.5C with no or a limited overshoot, net global carbon dioxide emissions need to fall by 45% from 2010 quantities by 2030 and to then achieve net-zero emissions by 2050.
Given that urgency, the only issue or question that matters for emissions reduction policy is “does it reduce anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases rapidly and effectively”?
Based on that criteria, the New Zealand emissions trading scheme (NZETS) completely fails as a policy. The only other NZ Government policy programme that also fails to this same catastrophic extent is - the Ministry for the Environment’s current process of incrementally amending minute details of the NZETS. This consultation is no exception.
Therefore I disagree with and completely reject the minimalist scope of this consultation. I am deliberately going outside the scope of the consultation as the Ministry needs to be called out for this inadequate and frankly egregious approach.
When the critical and urgent need is for policies that rapidly reduce emissions of greenhouse gases, proposals such as this consultation for minimalist incremental changes to the deeply flawed industrial allocation rules are merely “rearranging the deckchairs on the Titanic”.
I am appalled that officials have proposed such limited policy actions that are so obviously not commensurate with the magnitude and severity of the climate emergency. I am appalled that the Government and the Minister have allowed this pathetically incremental approach.
I consider it is well understood what is wrong with the NZETS industrial allocation policy. I will list a few points.
- The industrial allocation results in the gross overallocation of emissions units to emitters,
- It is a process that assumes existing allocations are property rights of emitters,
- There is an implicit assumption that existing allocations have some logical basis in good policy rather than it being the result of vested interest political lobbying and compromise,
- There is no fixed cap on emissions because of production-based allocation of emission units,
- The baselines show no logical relationship to the established IPCC emissions factors used in the Greenhouse Gas Inventory reporting and unit surrenders,
- The baselines include the Electricity Allocation Factor - which is an empirically invalid proxy for unverified and unproven energy and electricity pass-through costs,
- Major industrial emitters such as NZ Steel and NZ Aluminium Smelters Ltd are net sellers of units as they receive so many free emissions units,
- Units are allocated to non-participants of the ETS who have no surrender obligations (the hothouse horticulture sector),
- The 30-year timeline of incremental 1% or 2% or 3% annual phase-out of allocations is completely inadequate as an emitter could maintain the same allocation of units, despite the 1% phase down, by simply producing more output each year.
In summary, the New Zealnd Emissions Trading Scheme is grossly deficient to the extent that it deviates from a simple and transparent design of a capped number of emission units applied without exception across all relevant economic sectors as in the Greenhouse Gas Inventory - with units to be surrendered by emitters with no free allocation.
Recommendations
The first-and-best policy recommendation I wish to make is that; "industrial allocation of free emission units should be immediately terminated".
The second best policy recommendation I would make is that “all industrial allocation of units is phased out within three years or a similar very short timeframe (much as the "two-for-one" units surrender discount was phased out from 2017 to 2019).
The third best policy recommendation I would make is that “any short-term industrial allocation of units must immediately exclude energy costs (the EAF) so that no emitters are net sellers of units under industrial allocation”.
The fourth best policy recommendation I would make is that “if there is a limited and short term period of rapid phase out of industrial allocation, and if baselines are validly needed, then the emissions baselines used should be the relevant emissions factors from the Greenhouse Gas Inventory”.
Consultation questions
Question 1: Do you agree with the five criteria to assess the proposals in this consultation document? Why, or why not?
I strongly disagree with the criteria. This sort of policy minutiae is rearranging the deckchairs on the Titanic. The first best policy is elimination of free industrial allocation of units over the shortest time period possible.
Question 2: Should allocative baselines be updated using new base years? Why, or why not?
I strongly disagree. This sort of policy minutiae is rearranging the deckchairs on the Titanic. When allocations are being eliminated as rapidly as possible, it will be irrelevant what baseline is used. Grandparenting allocations will be adequate if the public can see that all free allocation will end in the short term e.g. over three years.
Question 3: Should the reassessment be a one-off update, or a periodic update? Why, or why not?
I strongly disagree. Reassessment is completely pointless. It is rearranging the deckchairs on the Titanic. The first best policy is elimination of free industrial allocation of units over the shortest time period possible.
Question 4: If periodic reassessment is legislated, what would be an appropriate period – every year, 5 years, 10 years, or something else? Why?
I strongly disagree. Periodic reassessment is completely pointless. It is rearranging the deckchairs on the Titanic. The first best policy is elimination of free industrial allocation of units over the shortest time period possible.
Question 5: Do you agree the financial years 2016/17, 2017/18 and 2018/19 should be used as new base years to update allocative baselines? Why, or why not? I strongly disagree. This is completely pointless. It is rearranging the deckchairs on the Titanic. The first best policy is elimination of free industrial allocation of units over the shortest time period possible.
Question 6: Should the financial years 2019/20 and 2020/21 be included, but with a weighting provision? Why, or why not?
I strongly disagree. This is completely pointless. It is rearranging the deckchairs on the Titanic. The first best policy is elimination of free industrial allocation of units over the shortest time period possible.
Question 7: Should eligibility be reassessed using new base years?
I strongly disagree. This is completely pointless. It is rearranging the deckchairs on the Titanic. The first best policy is elimination of free industrial allocation of units over the shortest time period possible.
Question 8: Should new emissions intensity thresholds for New Zealand industry be developed? Why, or why not?
Strongly no. Developing new thresholds is completely pointless. It is rearranging the deckchairs on the Titanic. The first best policy is elimination of free industrial allocation of units over the shortest time period possible.
Question 9: Should more thresholds be added into the eligibility criteria? Why, or why not? How many would be appropriate?
I strongly disagree. This is completely pointless. It is rearranging the deckchairs on the Titanic. The first best policy is elimination of free industrial allocation of units over the shortest time period possible.
Question 10: Would a sliding scale threshold system better target eligibility and assistance? Why, or why not?
I strongly disagree. This is completely pointless. It is rearranging the deckchairs on the Titanic. The first best policy is elimination of free industrial allocation of units over the shortest time period possible.
Question 11: Should the New Zealand EAF be used when determining eligibility? Why, or why not?
I strongly disagree. The first best policy is elimination of free industrial allocation of units over the shortest time period possible. Even if there is retention of allocation for a short period, the EAF should be immediately abolished so that no emitter receives more units than they are required to surrender.
Question 12: Should periodic updates of the EAF trigger a recalculation of eligibility? Why, or why not? I strongly disagree. This is completely pointless. It is rearranging the deckchairs on the Titanic. The EAF should be abolished and not included in any very short phase-out term. If industrial allocation is to continue for even a short term, the rules must ensure no emitter is a net seller of units after allocation.
Question 13: Should the trade exposure test be changed? Why, or why not?
I strongly disagree. This is completely pointless. It is rearranging the deckchairs on the Titanic. The trade exposure test should be abolished even if industrial allocation continues for a very short limited period.
Question 14: What would be a more appropriate method to determine trade exposure?
This is completely pointless. It is rearranging the deckchairs on the Titanic. The trade exposure test should be abolished.
Question 15: Do you agree with the proposal to simplify the process to update allocative baselines, to reflect changes to emissions factors, EAF or other changes to methodology? Why, or why not?
I strongly disagree. This is completely pointless. It is rearranging the deckchairs on the Titanic. In the context of the need to rapidly phase out allocation (if not immediate cessation) there is no point updating baselines. The EAF should be abolished and not included in any very short phase-out term. If industrial allocation is to continue for even a short term, the rules must ensure no emitter is a net seller of units after allocation.
Question 16: Are there other changes to sections 161A-E of the Act that could better streamline IA processes?
It is absolutely too late to be ‘streamlining’ sections 161A-E of the Act. All sections of the Climate Change Response Act providing for free allocation should be repealed.
Question 17: Do you agree with the proposal to clarify the eligibility process for new activities? Why, or why not?
I strongly disagree. Free industrial allocation should be terminated as quickly as possible. No new entrants should be permitted.
Question 18: Should new activities be able to seek eligibility? Why, or why not?
I strongly disagree. Free industrial allocation should be terminated as quickly as possible. No new entrants should be permitted.
Question 19: Should there be any caveats on new activities seeking eligibility, such as proof of environmental benefits compared to existing activities?
Free industrial allocation should be terminated as quickly as possible. Future eligibility should be irrelevant. No new entrants should be permitted.
Question 20: Should firms that receive IA be required to report their emissions, revenue and production data annually? Why, or why not?
Yes. And unit surrenders should be reported. That is simple transparency and good governance of a market. It speaks volumes as to the inadequacy of the NZETS and it’s lack of transparency that firms receiving industrial allocation have not to date been required to report their emissions, revenues and production data.
Question 21: Would voluntary reporting be more appropriate, and still provide some oversight of leakage and over-allocation risk? Why, or why not?
I strongly disagree. That would be an abuse of transparency. That is the opposite of oversight.
Question 22: Should the five-year transition period for changes in eligibility status remain, or be changed? Why, or why not?
This is completely pointless. A five year period for changes in eligibility is a nonsense in the context of a rapid phase out of allocation. It is rearranging the deckchairs on the Titanic. The first best policy is elimination of free industrial allocation of units over the shortest time period possible.
Question 23: Should we look at an alternative mechanism to address emissions leakage? Why, or why not?
No, this is completely pointless. "Emissions leakage" is just the NZ Initiative policy of "fast follower" (e.g. climate policy laggard) dressed in sheep's clothing. Emissions leakage should be irrelevant now that the world has a universally agreed international treaty - the Paris Agreement - to reduce emissions to net zero near 2050. Under the Paris Agreement NZ is only responsible for its own emissions. Other countries are responsible for their sovereign emissions.
Question 24: What alternative mechanisms to IA would better address the risk of emissions leakage, and support domestic and international emissions reduction targets?
Emissions leakage should be irrelevant now that the world has a universally agreed international treaty - the Paris Agreement - to reduce emissions to net zero near 2050. Under the Paris Agreement NZ is only responsible for its own emissions. Other countries are responsible for their sovereign emissions.
Question 25: Should IA policy or any alternative explicitly encourage firms to reduce emissions? Why, or why not?
Frankly, given the state of the climate emergency, I can’t even understand why Ministry officials would even ask that question in a NZETS consultation. Reducing emissions is the only point of emissions trading.
Question 26: What method could be used to encourage emissions reductions?
A well designed, capped, no-industrial-allocation, all sectors all-auctions NZETS would encourage emissions reductions.
Question 27: Should IA decisions or any alternative include wider considerations – such as economic, social, cultural and environmental factors – when determining support for industry? Why, or why not?
No, absolutely not. Why on Earth would NZETS policy be based on any criteria other than reducing emissions? NZ has had 10 years of "wider considerations" in the NZETS and the result has been excessive wealth-transferring free industrial allocation to emitters. Effective policy incentivising rapid reduction in emissions must start immediately.
Question 28: How would these new considerations interact with the goal of reducing emissions leakage?
Honestly, this is ridiculous. See previous comment.
Question 29: Do you have any other comments, ideas or critical feedback that could help support the Government form final policy decisions?
Just to repeat. The world is facing a climate emergency. According to the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report (WG1), in order to limit warming to 1.5C with no or a limited overshoot, net global carbon dioxide emissions need to fall by 45% from 2010 quantities by 2030 and to then achieve net-zero emissions by 2050.
Given that urgency, the only issue or question that matters for emissions reduction policy is “does it reduce anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases rapidly and effectively”?
Based on that criteria, the New Zealand emissions trading scheme (NZETS) completely fails as a policy. The only other NZ Government policy programme that also fails to this same catastrophic extent is - the Ministry for the Environment’s current process of incrementally amending minute details of the NZETS. This consultation is no exception.
Therefore I disagree with and completely reject the minimalist scope of this consultation. I am deliberately going outside the scope of the consultation as the Ministry needs to be called out for this inadequate and frankly egregious approach.
When the critical and urgent need is for policies that rapidly reduce emissions of greenhouse gases, proposals such as this consultation for minimalist incremental changes to the deeply flawed industrial allocation rules are merely “rearranging the deckchairs on the Titanic”.
I am appalled that officials have proposed such limited policy actions that are so obviously not commensurate with the magnitude and severity of the climate emergency. I am appalled that the Government and the Minister for Climate Change Issues have allowed this pathetically incremental approach.